Abstract. We study nonzero-sum stochastic games for continuous time Markov chains on a denumerable state space with risk sensitive discounted and ergodic cost criteria. For the discounted cost criterion we first show that the corresponding system of coupled HJB equations has an appropriate solution. Then under an additional additive structure on the transition rate matrix and payoff functions, we establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium in Markov strategies. For the ergodic cost criterion we assume a Lyapunov type stability assumption and a small cost condition. Under these assumptions we show that the corresponding system of coupled HJB equations admits a solution which leads to the existence of Nash equilibrium in stationary strategies.
Introduction
We study nonzero-sum stochastic games on infinite time horizon for continuous time Markov chains on a denumerable state space. The performance evaluation criterion is exponential of integral cost which addresses the decision makers (i.e., players) attitude towards risk. In other words we address the problem of nonzero-sum risk sensitive stochastic games involving continuous time Markov chains. In the literature of stochastic games involving continuous time Markov chains, one usually studies the integral of the cost (see, e.g., Guo and Hernández-Lerma [16] , [17] , [18] ) which is the so called risk-neutral situation. In the exponential of integral cost, the evaluation criterion is multiplicative as opposed to the additive nature of evaluation criterion in the integral of cost case. This difference makes the risk sensitive case significantly different from its risk neutral counterpart. The study of risk sensitive criterion was first introduced by Bellman in [2] ; see Whittle [30] and the references therein. Though this criterion is studied extensively in the context of stochastic dynamic optimization both in discrete and continuous time (see, e.g., Cavazos-Cadena and Fernandez-Gaucherand [5] , Di Masi and Stettner [6] , [7] , [8] , Fleming and Hernández-Hernández [11] , [12] , Fleming and McEneaney [13] , Hernández-Hernández and Marcus [19] , [20] , Howard and Matheson [22] , Jacobson [23] , Rothblum [28] ), the corresponding results for stochastic dynamic games are rather sparse. Notable exceptions are Basar [1] , El-Karoui and Hamadene [9] , James et al. [24] , Klompstra [25] . Recently risk sensitive continuous time Markov decision processes has been studied by Ghosh and Saha [14] , Kumar and Pal [26] , [27] . In this paper we extend the results of the above three papers to the nonzero-sum stochastic games. In particular we establish the existence of a Nash equilibria for risk-sensitive discounted and long-run average (or ergodic) cost criteria.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 deals with the problem description and preliminaries. The discounted cost criterion is analyzed in Section 3. Here we first establish the existence of a solution to the corresponding coupled Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equations. Then under certain additive structure on the transition rate (infinite) matrix and payoff functions, we establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium in Markov strategies. In Section 4, we turn our attention to the ergodic cost criterion. Under a Lyapunov type stability assumption and a small cost assumption, we carry out the vanishing discount asymptotics. This leads to the existence of appropriate solutions to the coupled HJB equations for the ergodic cost criterion. This in turn leads to the existence of a Nash equilibrium in stationary strategies. We conclude our paper in Section 5 with a few remarks.
Problem Description and Preliminaries
For the sake of notational simplicity we treat two player game. The Nplayer game for N ≥ 3 is analogous. Let U i , i = 1, 2, be compact metric spaces and V i = P(U i ), the space of probability measures on U i with Prohorov topology. Let U := U 1 × U 2 and V := V 1 × V 2 .
Letπ ij : U → [0, ∞) for i = j andπ ii : U → R for i ∈ S. Define π ij : V → R as follows: for v := (v 1 , v 2 ) ∈ V ,
where u := (u 1 , u 2 ) ∈ U , i, j ∈ S := {1, 2, · · · }. Throughout this paper we assume that: (A1) The transition ratesπ ij (u) ≥ 0 for all i = j, u ∈ U and the transition ratesπ ij (u) are conservative, i.e., j∈Sπ ij (u) = 0 for i ∈ S and u ∈ U .
The functionsπ ij are continuous and sup i∈S,u∈U
[−π ii (u)] := M < ∞ .
We consider a continuous time controlled Markov chain Y (t) with state space S and controlled rate matrix Π v 1 ,v 2 = (π ij (v 1 , v 2 )), given by the stochastic integral (2.1) dY (t) = R h(Y (t−), v 1 (t), v 2 (t), z)℘(dzdt).
Here ℘(dzdt) is a Poisson random measure with intensity dzdt, where dzdt denotes the Lebesgue measure on R × [0, ∞). The control process v(·) := (v 1 (·), v 2 (·)) takes value in V , and h : S × V × R → R is defined as follows: We denote the set of all Markov strategies by M i and the set of all stationary strategies by S i for the ith player. The spaces S 1 and S 2 are endowed with the product topology. Since V 1 and V 2 are compact, it follows that S 1 and S 2 are compact as well. The existence of a unique weak solution to the equation (2.1) for a pair of Markov strategies (v 1 , v 2 ) for a given initial distribution µ ∈ P(S) follows using the assumption (A1), see Guo and Hernández-Lerma [ [15] , Theorem 2.3, Theorem 2.5, pp. [14] [15] .
We now list the commonly used notations below.
•
denotes the set of all infinitely differentiable functions on (a, b) with compact support.
where W is the Lyapunov function as in (A3) (to be described in Section 4). Define for h ∈ B W (S),
Then B W (S) is a Banach space with the norm · W . For k = 1, 2, letr k : S × U 1 × U 2 → [0, ∞) be the running cost function for the kth player, i.e., when state of the system is i and the actions (u 1 , u 2 ) are chosen by the players, then the kth player incurs a cost at the rate of r k (i, u 1 , u 2 ). Throughout this paper, we assume that the functionsr k are bounded and continuous. Each player wants to minimize his accumulated cost over his strategies. The time horizon is infinite and we consider two risk sensitive cost evaluation criteria, viz., discounted cost and ergodic cost criteria which we describe now.
In other words given that player 2 is using the strategy v 2 ∈ S 2 , v * 1 ∈ S 1 is an optimal response for player 1. Clearly v * 1 depends on v 2 and moreover there may be several optimal responses for player 1 in S 1 . Analogous results holds for player 2 if player 1 announces that he is going to use a strategy v 1 ∈ S 1 . Hence given a pair of strategies (v 1 , v 2 ) ∈ S 1 × S 2 , we can find a set of pairs of optimal responses {(v * 1 , v * 2 ) ∈ S 1 × S 2 } via the appropriate pair of HJB equations described above. This defines a set-valued map. Clearly any fixed point of this set-valued map is a Nash equilibrium.
The above discussion leads to the following procedure for finding a pair of Nash equilibrium strategies for ergodic cost criterion. Suppose that there exist a pair of stationary strategies (v * 1 , v * 2 ) ∈ S 1 × S 2 , a pair of scalars (ρ * 1 , ρ * 2 ) and a pair of functions (ψ * 1 ,ψ * 2 ) with appropriate growth conditions, such that the coupled HJB equations given by
Since logarithmic is an increasing function, therefore any Nash equilibrium for the criterion (2.3) is Nash equilibrium for above criterion. To establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium for the discounted cost criterion, we first study the corresponding coupled HJB equations.
3.1. Coupled HJB Equations for the Discounted Case. Let v 2 ∈ S 2 be an arbitrarily fixed strategy of the second player. Consider the CTMDP for player 1 with the α-discounted (α > 0) risk-sensitive cost criterion
where Y (t) is the process (2.1) corresponding to (v 1 , v 2 ) ∈ M 1 × S 2 with initial condition i ∈ S.
We define the value function for the cost criterion (3.2) by
Then by the result of Ghosh and Saha [14] , Kumar and Pal [26] , ψ
Similarly let player 1 fix a strategy v 1 ∈ S 1 and consider the CTMDP for player 2 with α-discounted risk-sensitive cost criterion
Then, as before, ψ
To proceed further we establish some technical results needed later.
Lemma 3.1. Assume (A1). Then for each θ k ∈ (0, Θ), k = 1, 2, and α > 0,
, and dψ
where · ∞ denotes the sup-norm.
Proof. Since
Similarly for ψ v 1 α,2 we obtain
It is easily seen that
For each ǫ > 0,
for some θ ǫ which lies on the line segment joining θ 1 and θ 1 + ǫ. Therefore
Analogous bound can be proved if ǫ < 0. Hence it follows that dψ
Using analogous arguments we can show that dψ
This completes the proof.
Thus by Arzela-Ascoli theorem there exists a function α,1 } converges uniformly to ψ α,1 over compact subset of (0, Θ) × S. Let ϕ ∈ C ∞ c (0, Θ). Then we have
Letting m → ∞ along a suitable subsequence and using (A1), we get for each i ∈ S,
Therefore we have
in the sense of distribution. Note that right hand side above is continuous. Therefore
Therefore, using Itô's formula, ψ α,1 admits the following representation
Hence ψ α,1 = ψv satisfying the following coupled HJB equations
Obviously v * 1 depends on θ 1 and α. We suppress this dependence for notational simplicity. Then by a standard measurable selection theorem (see Beneš [3] ), H(v 2 ) is a non empty subset of S 1 . Clearly H(v 2 ) is convex. It is easy to show that H(v 2 ) is closed and hence compact.
Similarly for i ∈ S, v 1 ∈ S 1 and v 2 ∈ V 2 , set
α,2 is the solution of the equation (3.4) . Let
Then, as before, H(v 1 ) is convex and compact. Define
is nonempty, convex, and compact subset of
defines a point to set map from S 1 ×S 2 to 2 S 1 ×S 2 . Next we want to show that this map is upper semicontinuous.
Since S 1 is compact, it has a convergent subsequence, denoted by the same sequence with an abuse of notation, such thatv
. Now using Lemmata 3.1 and 3.2, we obtain
Now fixṽ 1 ∈ S 1 and consider the sequence (ṽ 1 , v m 2 ). Repeat the above argument to conclude that
Using the factv m 1 ∈ H(v m 2 ), we have
Using analogous arguments, we obtainv 2 ∈ H(v 1 ). The upper semicontinuity of the map
α,2 ) satisfy the coupled HJB equations (3.5). α,2 is continuously differentiable with respect to θ 2 . We have suppressed this dependence on θ 2 (resp. on θ 1 ) for notational convenience.
(ii) Note that for the discounted cost criterion the corresponding coupled HJB equations are given by (3.5) . However, the pair of stationary strategies
does not constitute a Nash equilibrium for this criterion. If player 1 announces his strategy v * 1 then the optimal response for player 2 for the discounted criterion is given by the the Markov strategy v * 2 (θ 2 e −αt , i). An analogous statement holds for optimal response of player 1. Thus the existence of a pair of Nash equilibrium in Markov strategies for the discounted cost criterion needs further analysis which we carry out in the next subsection.
Existence of Nash Equilibrium for Discounted Cost Criterion.
In this subsection we establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium under the following additive structure onπ
, assumed to be bounded and continuous. These type of additive structure are rather standard in non-zero sum stochastic differential games (see, e.g., Borkar and Ghosh [4] ) and non-zero sum stochastic games on an uncountable state space by Himmelberg et al. [21] . In fact in stochastic games these conditions are referred to as ARAT (additive reward, additive transition). Now we define a class of strategies to be referred to as eventually stationary strategies denoted byŜ k , k = 1, 2. Let
Note that as opposed to S k , the topology of pointwise convergence onŜ k is not metrizable. Thus we endow the spaceŜ k with the weak* topology on L ∞ ((0, Θ)×S, M s (U k )), k = 1, 2, introduced by Warga [29] for the topology of relaxed controls, where M s (U k ) is the space of all finite signed measure on U k endowed with the topology of weak convergence. Note that with the above topology,Ŝ k becomes a compact metrizable space with following convergence criterion: For k = 1, 2,v n k →v k inŜ k as n → ∞ if and only if for each i ∈ S (3.8)
The Markov strategies associated withv k ∈Ŝ k , k = 1, 2 is given byv k (θe −αt , Y (t−)), t ≥ 0 for each θ ∈ (0, Θ) and α > 0, where Y (t) is the solution of the equation
By an abuse of notation, we represent the eventually stationary Markov strategies by elements ofŜ k though each member inŜ k corresponds to a family of Markov strategies indexed by θ and α. Note that as t → ∞, e −αt → 0. Thus in the long run an element ofŜ k "eventually" becomes an element of S k . Hence the terminology.
By using similar arguments as in previous subsection it follows thatψv 2 α,1 is a bounded and absolutely continuous function satisfying the the following equation
α,2 is a bounded and absolutely continuous function satisfying the the following equation
α,2 (0, i) = 1. As before we can establish the following result, we omit the details. Lemma 3.3. Assume (A1). Then for θ ∈ (0, Θ) and α > 0 andv k ∈ S k , k = 1, 2, we have
Lemma 3.4. Assume (A1). Then the mapsv 1 →ψv
Letv 2 ∈Ŝ 2 . For i ∈ S, v 1 ∈ V 1 and θ 1 ∈ (0, Θ), set
Similarly for i ∈ S,v 1 ∈Ŝ 1 , v 2 ∈ V 2 θ 2 ∈ (0, Θ), set
, and
Then using arguments as in Theorem 3.1, it follows thatH(v 1 ,v 2 ) is nonempty, convex, and compact subset ofŜ 1 ×Ŝ 2 . Therefore (
. Now we establish the following result.
Lemma 3.5. Assume (A1) and (A2). Then the map
. Thenv m 1 ⊂Ŝ 1 . SinceŜ 1 is compact, it has a convergent subsequence, denoted by the same sequence with an abuse of notation, such thatv
. Now using (A2), Lemmata 3.3 and 3.4, and the topology ofŜ k , k = 1, 2 it follows that for each i ∈ S
Thus, by Banach-Saks theorem any sequence of convex combination of the former converges strongly in L 2 (0, Θ) to the latter. Hence along a suitable subsequence i) ), a.e. in θ 1 . Now fixṽ 1 ∈Ŝ 1 and consider the sequence (ṽ 1 , v m 2 ). Repeat the above argument to conclude that
Using the factv m 1 ∈ H(v m 2 ), for any m we havẽ i) ), a.e. in θ 1 . v 1 (θ 1 , i),v 2 (θ 1 , i) ), a.e. in θ 1 .
Thus for anyṽ
and along a subsequencē v m 2 →v 2 inŜ 2 . Using analogous arguments, we obtainv 2 ∈H(v 1 ). This prove that the map
is upper semicontinuous. Theorem 3.2. Assume (A1) and (A2). There exists α-discounted Nash equilibrium in the classŜ 1 ×Ŝ 2 .
Proof. From Lemma 3.5 and Fan's fixed point theorem [10] , there exists a fixed point (v
This implies that (ψv * 2 α,1 ,ψv * 1 α,2 ) satisfies the following coupled HJB equations (3.14)
α,2 (0, i) = 1. Now from (3.10), we havẽ
This proves the existence of α-discounted Nash equilibrium which is eventually stationary Markov strategies.
Vanishing Discount Asymptotics
In this section we prove the existence of Nash equilibrium strategies for the ergodic cost criterion in the class of stationary Markov strategies under the following assumption: (A3)(Lyapunov condition) There exist constants b > 0, δ > 0, a finite set C and a map W :
We refer to Guo and Hernández-Lerma [15] for examples of controlled continuous time Markov chains satisfying the above condition.
Throughout this section, we assume that for every pair of stationary Markov strategies (v 1 , v 2 ) the corresponding Markov chain is irreducible. First we truncate our cost functions: This process plays a crucial role in finding a Nash equilibrium of the game. For k = 1, 2, let r n k :
Then as in the previous section we can show the following result.
Theorem 4.1. Assume (A1). Then there exist a pair of Markov stationary strategy (v * 1,n , v * 2,n ) and a pair of bounded, continuously differentiable functions (ψ
In what follows we fix a reference state i 0 ∈ S satisfying
. 
Then a straightforward calculation shows thatψ
Using analogous arguments we can show thatψ
This immediately yields the following result:
Theorem 4.2. Assume (A1). Then there exist a pair of Markov stationary strategy (v * 1,n , v * 2,n ) and a pair of bounded, continuously differentiable
Next we want to take limit α → 0. To this end we show thatψ
α,2n be given by (4.3), then the following inequalities hold:
Proof. From Lemma 3.1, we have
Then we have dH 1n
Using analogous arguments as in the proof of Lemma 3.1, we can show that for each ǫ > 0,
Analogous bound can be obtained for ǫ < 0. Therefore we have
Note that
Using analogous arguments we can show that
This completes the proof. 
where τ is the hitting time of the process Y (t) corresponding to (v 1 , v * 2,n ) ∈ M 1 × M 2 to the setS. Lemma 4.2. Assume (A1) and (A3). Let Y (t) be the process (2.1) corre-
Proof. Applying Itô-Dynkin's formula to f (t) = e δt W (Y (t)), and using (A3), we obtain
where τ N = inf{t ≥ 0|Y (t) / ∈ {1, 2, . . . , N }}. Hence
By letting N → ∞ and invoking Fatou's lemma, we obtain
Therefore,
Before proceeding further we make the following small cost assumption. (A4) θ 1 r 1 ∞ ≤ δ and θ 2 r 2 ∞ ≤ δ, where δ > 0 is as in (A3). 
Proof. Applying Itô-Dynkin's formula to
and using (A3) and (A4), we obtain
Lemma 4.4. Assume (A1), (A3) and (A4). Then where τ i 0 = inf{t ≥ 0|Y (t) = i 0 }. In the last inequality we used the fact
The last inequality follows from Lemma 4.2. Using analogous arguments we can show thatψ Proof. Let i ≥ n+1 and let Y (t) be the solution corresponding to (v 1 , v * 2,n ) ∈ M 1 × S 2 with initial condition i. Then from Theorem 4.3, we have
In the last inequality we used the fact that ψ 
where C 0 is as in Lemma 4.2.
Proof. From Theorem 4.3, we have forv
where τ i = inf{t ≥ 0|Y (t) = i}. In the last inequality we used the fact that
The last inequality follows from Lemma 4.2. Using analogous arguments we obtain the other bound. This completes the proof. 
Proof. Using Lemma 4.4, for each fix i, {ψ 
Hence ̺ * 1n is a function of θ 1 alone. Also by Lemma 4.1,
It follows from (4.6) and (4.
is also a function of θ 1 alone. Thus we have: for each θ 1 > 0, there exists a constant ρ * 1n such that along a suitable subsequence
Using analogous arguments, we have along a suitable subsequence
where ρ * 2n is a constant. Let all sequences above converge along a common subsequence α m . From Let Y (t) be the process corresponding to (v 1 , v * 2,n ) with initial condition i ∈ S. Then using Itô-Dynkin's formula and (4.5), we get Since θ 1 r n 1 ≤ θ 1 r 1 ≤ δ, it follows that 0 ≤ ρ * 1n ≤ δ. Similarly we can show that 0 ≤ ρ * 2n ≤ δ. Therefore we have sup n {ρ * 1n , ρ * 2n } ≤ δ. This completes the proof.
Finally we prove that the coupled HJB equations described in Section 2 have suitable solutions which in turn leads to the existence of a Nash equilibrium in stationary strategies. 
Conclusion
We have established the existence of a pair of stationary strategies which constitutes a pair of Nash equilibrium strategies for risk sensitive stochastic games for continuous time Markov chain with ergodic cost. We have achieved these under a Lyapunov type stability assumption (A3) and a small cost condition (A4) which lead to the existence of suitable solution to the corresponding coupled HJB equations. The Lyapunov type of stability assumption is standard in literature (see, e.g., Guo and Hernández-Lerma [15] ). The small cost assumption mean that the risk aversion parameter θ k of player k must be small. For the discounted cost criterion we have established the existence of Nash equilibrium in Markov strategies under an additive structure (A2). It will be interesting to investigate if (A2) can be dropped to achieve the same result.
